This paper investigates asset pricing in a three-period overlapping generations (OLG) model economy where each generation lives as young, middle-aged and old. There is one perishable consumption good in the economy and two types of traded securities in the capital market: a bond and a share of equity. Implications for asset pricing and security returns of an increasing risk aversion are explored by allowing each agent's coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion to vary with his age; the middle-aged consumer has a higher aversion to risk than the young and the old consumers are more risk averse than the middle-aged ones. Our model produces high equity premium without requiring very large levels of consumer risk aversion; a result more consistent with the U.S. data. We further modify our model to re ‡ect the U.S. demographic trend of an increasing share of older age group. This new speci…cation generates an even higher equity premium and a lower risk-free rate of return with an added desirable result of a lower standard deviation for the risk premium. 1 We would like to thank John B. Donaldson for his helpful comments and suggestions. All remaining errors are ours.
Introduction
Since Mehra and Prescott's (1985) seminal work on the equity premium puzzle, researchers have taken di¤erent approaches in constructing models that are consistent with the large equity premium as well as with other related stylized facts observed in the data. The authors using reasonable parameters in a representative-consumer exchange economy model fail to match the high equity premium as well as the return volatilities observed in the data for the U.S. economy. There is also no explanation why the observed real risk-free rate (the return on the T-bills) is so low. This is known as the risk-free rate puzzle (Epstein and Zin (1989) ). The above work has spurred a rich era of research in the …eld of asset pricing, most of which aimed to conciliate the observed stylized facts with reasonably speci…ed models. Zhou (1999) introduces information asymmetry and market imperfections into a rational expectations equilibrium model. Using an overlapping generations (OLG) model with informed and uninformed agents, and with a reasonable relative risk aversion coe¢ cient of 5, they conclude that both the equity premium puzzle as well as the risk-free rate puzzle can be resolved. This suggests that non-standard models can be used to explain these well chronicled inconsistencies with the data.
Another strand of research focuses on the agent's preference speci…cations. Among them are the studies by Abel (1990) , Constantinides (1990) , Epstein and Zin (1991) , Campbell and Cochrane (1999) , and Danthine, Donaldson, Giannikos, and Guirguis (2004). Danthine, Donaldson, Giannikos, and Guirguis (2004) explore the case of state depen-1 dent preferences. In their paper the agent's relative risk aversion parameter is related to the output growth rate. By allowing the risk aversion parameter to vary (positively as well as negatively) with the growth rate of output, they …nd that for standard parametrization the equity premium is easily matched or exceeded, the risk-free rate is asymptotically too low, and that the Hansen-Jagannathan bounds are easily satis…ed. However, their model produces standard deviations of equity and risk free returns that are too large relative to the data.
Campbell and Cochrane (1999) take a di¤erent approach in dealing with the aforementioned problems. They use a power utility function that incorporates a time-varying subsistence level (slow-moving habit). Habit is introduced in the model in order to re ‡ect the fact that consumers'well-being is more related to recent consumption changes than to the absolute level of consumption. The e¤ect then is to make the local curvature of the utility function sensitive to the surplus consumption: if consumption is low relative to habit then the utility function exhibits high curvature, and vice-versa. This shows that habit is essentially a form of state dependent preferences. Their model is successful at producing results consistent with the observed data; both the equity premium puzzle and the risk-free rate puzzle are explained, and the model even reproduces some of the remaining stylized facts. Giannikos and Zhihong (2004) study the case of a pure exchange economy where the agent's preferences over a durable and a perishable good are habit forming. That is, the agent's past consumption of each of the two goods a¤ects the utility he gets from his current consumption. They …nd that this two-good economy with habit persistence generates the high level of risk premium observed in the U.S. data. Furthermore, this economy also produces lower risk-free rate volatility, a result more in line with the U.S.
data.
Another interesting work in the area is the model by Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001), which introduces two concepts borrowed from psychology into the standard consumption-based approach. The motivation for this comes from observations of riskaverse agents making choices in the face of risk. The …rst concept, "loss-aversion", re ‡ects the experimental evidence that agents are more sensitive to reductions in wealth than to increases. The second concept, "prior outcomes", has to do with the fact that the utility from present gains and losses in wealth depends on whether the agent su¤ered losses or made gains in prior periods. In this setting the agent's risk-aversion changes over time as a function of his investment performance. This reproduces the high mean, volatility, and predictability of stock returns.
As the above brief review of some of the work in the …eld indicates, the favored approach to solving these documented puzzles is by replacing the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences with alternative preference speci…cations, where the agent's preference parameter changes. Several studies have shown that the risk aversion parameter is not constant; it varies as a function of several di¤erent variables. For example, the work of Bosch-Domenech and Silvestre (1999) investigates through a series of experiments whether the risk aversion coe¢ cient varies with the level of income at risk. The results of these experiments suggest that the individuals'decision to buy insurance is positively correlated with their level of income at risk.
Most importantly however for our work, a signi…cant body of recent research supports the idea that as agents grow older they become more risk averse. One such study, by Anne-Marie Palsson (1996) , examines risk taking by households. She tries to identify household characteristics that a¤ect their aversion to risk. Using a cross-sectional data of more than 7000 Swedish households, she …nds that household risk aversion is positively related with the age of the head of the household.
Another study corroborating this hypothesis is the work of Bakshi and Chen (1994) .
They test the life-cycle risk aversion hypothesis that an investor's relative risk aversion increases with age. Using post-1945 U.S. data, they …nd that a rise in the average age predicts a rise in risk premiums. Additionally, Morin and Suarez (1983) studied the e¤ect of age on the speci…c composition of risky assets in people's portfolio. Using a 1970 Canadian Survey of Consumer Finance data, they conclude that the risk aversion coe¢ cient increases with age.
If the individual investor's aversion to risk changes with age, it becomes very important to know how this could a¤ect asset pricing, portfolio composition, capital allocation and ultimately economic growth. Quite simply, if as a consumer ages he becomes more risk averse, we expect to see his investment behavior change; he will demand increasingly higher returns to undertake risky investments. In a partial equilibrium setting, the above speci…cation for the agent's preferences will imply that the agent will tend to shift his portfolio wealth out of very risky assets and into relatively safer ones as he ages. Bakshi and Chen (1994) provide empirical support for this and conclude that individuals do in fact change their portfolio wealth allocations as they age.
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The economy-wide e¤ect of these portfolio changes depends on what happens to the age structure. If overall, as evidence indicates, the population is ageing over time, then relative asset prices will change as the aggregate demand for riskier assets will tend to drop. This will result in higher risky asset returns relative to the safer investments. Also, over time some forms of investments should become more and more attractive in the market depending on their risk level.
The U.S. population growth rate is quite small. Combined with the increased life expectancy, this means the share of older population cohorts is increasing. In fact, according to the U.S. Bureau of Census, currently 12.8 percent of the U.S. population is over the age of 65, a number that is expected to increase to over 20 percent by the year 2030. The proportion of households in the U.S. headed by someone 65 or older is also expected to be about 40% by 2040 compared to 22% in 1996. Thus, this population group is becoming more and more dominant over time. Just as important, the older age cohort also happens to be a very active market participant. According to Sheshinski and Tanzi (1989) Thus, the share of older population has been increasing at the same time that their in ‡uence on the market is increasing. Given the fact that these older market participants are also more risk averse, then we should see implications for asset prices and portfolio 5 composition. In particular, we would expect that over time the aggregate demand for each asset is going to be adjusted to re ‡ect the risk aversion shifts that come from the population age group shifts. Goyal (2004) con…rms this by showing that wealth is moved out of the stock market as the fraction of the population over 65 increases. Malkiel (1996) takes a similar position and suggests that the proportion of wealth invested in stocks should decline despite their higher return than the T-bills. Furthermore, Yoo (1994) …nds that the real U.S. T-bill return is negatively correlated with the size of the age group with the highest wealth increment.
Therefore the presence in the market of older, more risk averse agents carrying more and more wealth should work to increase the return of the risky assets relative to the safer ones, resulting in larger premiums. It would seem reasonable then that by introducing into the existing pricing models the higher risk aversion of the older age cohorts along with their increasing signi…cance, we might be able to get an asset pricing behavior closer to the observed facts. Would it be possible for a model economy where the older agents are more risk averse to produce the kind of behavior we see in the U.S. data? Will such an economy generate a large enough equity premium? A low enough real risk free rate? An important restriction is that these results do not require large unreasonable risk aversion parameters. This is the goal of the exercise we undertake in this paper.
We build on the overlapping-generations (OLG) model framework of Constantinides, Donaldson, and Mehra (2002) with three age cohorts. But, in our speci…cation, each age group has di¤erent levels of aversion to risk. That is, each period's representative consumer's risk aversion will increase as he ages. The middle-aged consumer has a higher 6 aversion to risk than the young and the old consumers are more risk averse than the middle-aged. In section II we introduce the model. In section III we present the results and compare these results to the benchmark case where all agents have the same level of risk aversion. In section IV we introduce a variant of the model where the total population share of the older age cohort is no longer the same as the one of the other age groups. In this section we discuss the implications for asset pricing of an increasing, more dominant, and more risk averse age group. Again, we compare our results with those obtained when each age cohort is equally weighted as in section III. Section V concludes.
The Model
We consider a three-period OLG model, where each generation lives as young, middleaged and old. Each consumer generation is modeled by a representative agent so that we can focus on across-generation di¤erences while ignoring possible heterogeneity within any particular generation.
There is one consumption good in each period and it perishes at the end of that period.
All the prices, wages, consumption, dividends, and coupons payments are quoted in terms of this single consumption good.
There is a …nancial market where two types of securities are traded; a bond and a share of equity, both in…nitely lived. The bond here works as a proxy for long-term government debt. The (consol) bond is default-free and pays a …xed coupon of b > 0 units of the consumption good in every period in perpetuity 1 . Its supply is …xed at B units. The aggregate coupon payment is B in every period and represents a portion of the economy's capital income. q b t is the ex coupon price of bond in period t. One perfectly divisible equity share is traded. The equity is the claim to the net dividend stream fd t g, the sum total of all the private capital income (stocks, corporate bonds, and real estate). Similarly, the ex dividend price of equity in period t is q e t and is the claim to the dividend stream in perpetuity, beginning with period t + 1. The total supply of equity is …xed at one.
The consumer born in period t gets a low deterministic w 0 > 0 wage income in period t, stochastic wage income w Market clearing in period t then requires that the demand for bonds and equity by the young and the middle-aged consumers equal their …xed supply. Therefore,
and similarly, 
Let c t;j denote the consumptions in period t + j (j = 0; 1; 2) of a consumer born in 8 period t. The budget constraint of the consumer born in period t is:
when young,
when middle-aged, and
when old. In the …rst period the young agent receives a relatively low deterministic endowment income. The middle-aged agent is employed and receives wages so his total income is made up of wages and proceeds from investing in the securities market. This means that his income is subject to some uncertainty. The old agent does not work, and consumes his entire wealth.
Furthermore, we require that c t;0 0, c t;1 0, and c t;2 0, thus ruling out negative consumption and personal bankruptcy.
There is an increasing sequence fI t : t = 0; 1; :::g of information sets available to consumers for their decision making each period t. I t contains information about all the past wage income and dividends up to and including period t. Furthermore, I t contains the consumption, bond investment, and stock investment histories of all the consumers up to and including period t 1. Consumption and investment decisions made in period t depend only on information available in period t. A consumption and investment policy of the consumer born in period t is the collection of the I t -measurable (c t;0 ; z b t;0 ; z e t;0 ), the I t+1 -measurable (c t;1 ; z b t;1 ; z e t;1 ), and the I t+2 -measurable c t;2 .
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The consumer born in period t has utility
where I t is the set of all the information available in period t, is the subjective discount factor with 0 < < 1.
The period utility function is
where i > 0 is the risk aversion parameter. This paper departs from Constantinides, , since the level of risk aversion is held constant throughout the agent's lifetime. But, as we noted in the introduction, several studies support the idea that the risk-aversion parameter is not constant but rather it varies with the agent's age.
We specify the joint process of the aggregate income and the wages of the middle-aged, (y t ; w 1 t ), where the aggregate income y t is
Following the work of Constantinides, Donaldson, and Mehra (2002), we study the borrowing-constrained version of the economy; the young agents earn low wages and would want to smooth their lifetime consumption by borrowing against future wage income.
They consume part of the loan and invest the rest in equity whose returns are higher than the loan rate. But, lacking collateral these young consumers …nd it di¢ cult to borrow against future wage income by shorting the bonds. The young consumers are however allowed to short equity, but this is immaterial since we calibrate our model economy using parameters for which the borrowing constraints are not binding and so the young choose not to short equity. Thus, the young are excluded from the bond market by their limited (human) collateral, and do not participate in the equity market. By leaving out the young from the decision making, the state s t 1 becomes irrelevant for decisions (and prices) of period t.
In this borrowing-constrained economy there exists a rational expectations equilibrium in which the young do not participate in the bond and equity markets. Therefore, lagged state variables are not present; decisions and prices in period t are measurable with respect to current state s t = j; j = 1; :::; 4, alone. 
and
where
We can drop the time subscripts.
Since z Thus, our FOC become:
with
for each state j of the economy.
Since our utility function is u(c t;i ; i ) = . Then
are the two equations to be estimated.
Calibration
The subjective discount factor beta is set equal to 0.44 since in the calibration each period is of length 20 years. This implies an annual discount factor of 0.96, the standard discount factor used in the literature.
The equilibrium joint distribution of the bond and equity returns is not dependent on the level of the exogenous macroeconomic variables for a …xed y, w 1 correlation structure.
Instead, the distribution depends on the following factors: (i) the average share of income going to labor, E(w 1 +w 0 )=E(y); (ii) the average share of income going to the labor of the young, w 0 =E(y); (iii) the average share of income going to interest on government debt, 
There are nine parameters to be estimated:
, H, and . These are chosen to satisfy the above moment conditions and as well as the condition (20), making sure that all the matrix entries are positive.
As Constantinides, Donaldson, and Mehra (2002) point out, there are some di¢ culties in computing the above moment conditions, mostly due to the fact that we are dealing with twenty year aggregates but only about a century-long data set. As a way to deal with these estimation problems, they perform sensitivity analysis using the following range of values.
(i) The average share of income going into labor, E(w 1 + w 0 )=E(y), is set in the lower half of the documented range (0.66,0.70).
(ii) The average share of income going to the labor of the young, w 0 =E(y), is set in the range (0. 16,0.20) . This number needs to be small enough to ensure that the young would need to borrow and therefore the borrowing constraint is binding in this economy.
(iii) The average share of income going to interest on government debt, b=E(y), is set at 0.03 which is consistent with the U.S. historical data.
14 (iv) The coe¢ cient of variation of the twenty-year wage income of the middle-aged, 
and the long run probability P = From Table I we see that the nominal mean equity return is 9-11 percent with a standard deviation of around 14 percent; the mean bond nominal return is about 4 percent with a standard deviation of 7-8 percent; and the mean equity premium is 5-7 percent with a standard deviation of 14-15 percent.
We are however more interested in the real returns since ours is a real model, and therefore, we the goal is to match the U.S. real return statistics. The real mean equity return is 6-7 percent with a standard deviation of 14-16 percent; the mean bond real return is about 1 percent with a standard deviation of 7 percent; and the mean equity premium is 5-7 percent with a standard deviation of 14-15 percent as we have seen. Note that since in the model the equity is de…ned as claim not just to corporate dividends but also to all the risky capital in the economy, the mean equity premium we want to match is around 3 percent.
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For all the reported results we set (y)=E ( Their model achieves a mean equity premium over the bond of 3% using RRA=4.0 for both the middle-aged and old agents, as seen in the third column of Table IIA . In our speci…cation, the old consumers are made more risk averse relative to the middle-aged consumers 3 , and this works to increase the mean risk premium: both the mean equity return and the bond returns increase relative to the base case, but the increase in the equity is larger, resulting in higher premium.
The e¤ect of linking the consumer's coe¢ cient of risk aversion to his age can be quite signi…cant; for example to match the 3.4 percent premium when all agents have an RRA of 6.0 (Table IIA , …fth column), all that is required is that we set RRA middle-aged=2.0 and RRA old=2.25. Thus, even though the average risk aversion level in our economy is much lower, the e¤ect of having the older age cohort more risk averse is so strong that it drives up the premium. The middle-aged agents know they will become more risk averse when they are older and thus dislike consumption variation even more at the time (when older). This explains why these agents are going to require much higher equity returns in order to invest in equity given its uncertain payo¤s in the future. This is not surprising in light of our discussion in the beginning of the paper. It also conforms to the numerous studies showing that investors tend to shift their portfolio wealth out of stocks as they age.
However, it appears that an additional factor is at work here. We can see that the (one-period) bond return also increases as we make the older agents more risk averse The middle-aged agents, who will be more risk averse in the future, are no longer as willing to give up consumption today in order to invest in the two securities (bond and equity).
They will now demand higher returns as compensation for giving up some of today's consumption. We will discuss this consumption shift some more later on in the paper.
Thus, the overall e¤ect is for all the security returns to increase, with the equity returns increasing by more than the bond returns. The implication of more risk averse older agents is that our model generates the security returns as well as risk premia found in the U.S. data without relying on very high levels of risk aversion, unlike some of the earlier work in this area. But, this speci…cation has the undesirable e¤ect of further increasing the bond returns (as we just discussed) as well as the security standard deviations relative to the data.
Looking at Tables II and III From tables II and III we can also see that the correlation of the labor income of the middle-aged (w 1 ) and the equity premium is consistently smaller than the correlation of the labor income of the middle-aged and the dividend. As Constantinides, Donaldson, and Mehra (2002) explain, this is another reason the young consumers …nd equity so attractive. Thus, they want to invest in equity for its high return and because equity has low correlation with their future consumption if most of that consumption comes from their future wage income, w 1 . In the model we presented however, the young are borrowing constrained, and so will not participate in the market.
One interesting question is then why the middle-aged consumers will invest in bonds despite the very high mean premium. Table V (similar to that consumers are more risk-averse relative to the young ones. As we discussed above, the middle-aged investors are now less willing to give up some of their current consumption in return for higher future consumption. They will demand higher returns in order to invest some of the current income and thus provide for future consumption. However, these middle-aged investors now dislike future consumption so much more that these higher returns are not enough to get them to part with their current consumption. Instead, they will consume relatively more now (compared to when everyone has the same risk aversion).
The overall e¤ect, as table V and VI show, is that the consumption of the middle-aged increases while the old agents'consumption across all states decrease. Additionally, the consumption of the middle-aged becomes much more variable relative to the consumption of the old. The standard deviation of the middle age consumption increases from 4938 to 7970 while the standard deviation of the consumption of the old remains around 19,000
(not shown in the table). This is true even when we use lower risk-aversion numbers for both types of consumers: panel B shows that old agent's consumption is now even lower and the middle-aged's is more variable relative to the benchmark case (RRA=4.0 and RRA=4.0).
Once again, it is the ratio RRA old RRA middle aged that is driving these results. As the ratio increases the ratio 
Additional Results
In this section we want to study impact of changing population age structure. As we saw in the introduction, the proportion of the older age group has been increasing over time not only in the U.S. but in most developed nations as well. Table VII We modify our model to introduce a population growth factor n; the population now grows at an exogenously …xed rate n. Population at t = 0 is normalized to consist of (1 + n) young people, 1 middle-aged person, and (
1+n
) old people. At any time t in the future there will be (1 + n) t+1 young, (1 + n) t middle-aged, and (1 + n) t 1 old people.
Therefore, the stationary age distribution of the population measured as fractions of the total number of individuals is: Young
, and Old
As n increases the fraction of the young people in the population increases while the fraction of the middle-aged and old decreases. We are especially interested in seeing the e¤ects of a decreasing n on steady state asset prices and risk premium. Lower values of n translate into a population structure with greater fractions of both the middle and old age cohorts. As we saw above, this is the case observed in the U.S. data over the last few years. Table VIII shows the fraction of the three age cohorts for a given population growth rate. When n = 0, the three age groups are equally represented in the total population. For n = 0:04 we see that the population is ageing, the younger age group is now a minority making up only 0.3198 share of the total population. The middle-aged and the old combine now for about 68 percent of all the population (the old age cohort fraction is 0.3470). Table IX shows the results for risk aversions pair RRA middle-aged=6.0 and RRA old=6.25. The case for n = 0 corresponds to our benchmark case, when the three age groups are distributed equally. The last column is the case in Constantinides, Donaldson and Mehra (2002) when the proportion of each age group is the same and all the agent have the same risk aversion parameter.
We can see that as n decreases the mean risk premium in the economy increases while its standard deviation goes down. Comparing the last two columns it is clear that increasing the share of the older, more risk averse consumers in our economy has the overall e¤ect of raising the risk premium by about a half percent.
Conclusion
In this paper we suggest a new approach to asset pricing, one that takes into consideration a vast body of literature linking an agent's level of risk aversion coe¢ cient to his age. This approach also incorporates the factual evidence from the U.S. data that the population age structure is changing, with the fraction of the older age cohorts increasing. Our experiment show that these small changes introduced in the standard models by our speci…cation lead to very interesting and signi…cant results. By making the consumers'aversion to risk a positive relation to their age, the equity premium and the consumption patterns of the agents will change quite signi…cantly. If the old agents make up a third of the total population, then even a small increase in the risk aversion coe¢ cient of this segment of the population (while keeping the average risk coe¢ cient for the population at large close to its initial number) has the e¤ect of increasing the equity premium in the economy.
Other e¤ects of this change are: the security returns increases as their price drop, and the old consumers' consumption decreases across all states of the economy relative to consumption of the middle-aged agents (the young agents'consumption remains the same, they still consume just their endowment). We also studied the implications of a changing population age structure. We introduce a population growth rate factor n that works to change the relative proportion of each age cohort in our model economy to match the U.S. population demographic trends of the last few decades. Not surprisingly, by increasing the share of the older, more risk averse age cohort in the population we obtain further increases in the equity premium but with a lower standard deviation. Therefore, the growth rate n produces results more in accordance with those observed in the data.
What makes our results interesting is that they do not rely on large levels of risk aversion coe¢ cient.
Our work shows that a way to conciliate the stylized data facts with the current asset pricing models may require modifying these models to re ‡ect the population trends and the empirical evidence of changing risk aversion parameters. Clearly, a lot more work is needed in this area before we are satis…ed, but there is no doubt that this is promising avenue. Note: Consumption of the young, middle-aged, and old and the conditional …rst moments of the returns at the four states of the economy. This results correspond to the case Corr(y; w 1 ) = 0:1, Corr(w 1 ; w 1 ) = 0:1, and Corr(y; y) = 0:1. The one-period discount bond is referred to as the bond. It is in zero net supply. The consol bond, which is in positive net supply, is referred to as the consol. This is the benchmark case of Constantinides, Donaldson, and Mehra (2002) . Both the middle-age and the old agents have a RRA of 4.00. Note: U.S. Census Bureau historical data and projections from CPS Reports P25-1130. Average age over 20 computed using the midpoint in 5-year age intervals as the average age for all persons in that interval, and assuming that the average age for persons 85 and older is 90. 
